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No. 85-428 -- c F,X
UNITED STATES

v.
FRIDAY, et al (Ag Extension
Service officials accused of
discrimination)

Cert to CA4 (Widener, Kellam
diss. by Phillips)

[sd~):

Federal/CivilTimely (with
extension)

No. 85-93 - c.F)<
BAZEMORE, et al (black ag
extension service employees)

Cert to CA4 (~idener, Kellam rsdj]:
diss. by Phillips)

v.
FRIDAY, et al (Ag Extension
Service officials accused of
discrimination)

Federal/Civil

-,

Timely

SUMMARY: Petrs challenge rulings by the de, affirmed by r.A4 1)

-

2 -

that differentials between wages paid to white and black employees

~

of the North Carolina Agricultural Extension Service (NCAES) did not
constitute employment

discrimination~

2) that maintenance of local

4-H clubs that are voluntarily segregated does not violate the

~itle

VI prohibition against discrimination in programs receiving federal

aid; and 3) that the NCAES did not discriminate against blacks in
selecting county extension chairmen.
FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

The NCAES provides informational

services to North Carolina farmers.

It is funded jointly through

u.s. Department of Agriculture, the State of North Carolina, and

the

the counties in which each office is located.
/

Until 1965, the NCAES

was strictly segregated, with a white branch staffed by white
employees serving white farmers and a black branch staffed by black
employees serving black farmers.

Although black ag extension agents

had identical job titles and responsibilities as their white
counterparts, the salaries of black employees were kept lower than
their white counterparts.
The black and white branches of NCAES were merged on August 1,
1965.

From that date onward, new b1ack and white employees were

paid the same initial salaries.

However, salary disparities as to

pre-1965 hired black employees remained in effect, and these
employees were still receiving less than their white counterparts
when Title VII became applicable to public employees in 1972.
Since each NCAES employee's salary is paid in part by the three
different entities that fund the service (feds, state, and county),
each employee's salary increases also depend on the varying
increases in funding for a particular position.

Some counties

-

pro,·icie merit pav increases
raises.

~t

~·hile

3 -

ot"'e.rs qrant across the

~a~d

the same time, the state may 9rovide a different amount

of increase in

a

different form.

Because

o~

these different

sources, salaries for identical positions tend to varv

fun~ing

wide.i.v fr~m

county to county.
The county extension chairman is in charge of coordinating the
extension program in each

count~·.

t''hen the posi tio:1 \oo'as created in

1Q65, chairmen were selected from among the extension aqents of each
county.

Only white agents were selected to fill the

positions.

ini~ial

As \'acancies have occurred since 1QI2, they ha\·e been

announced publicly .

Applicants are then interviewed by service

officials, \\•ho make recornrnendat ions to the board of county
commissioners.

The board of county commissioners makes the final

selection from arnonq the candidates so recommended.

~ew blac~

applicants have been selected as county chairmen, and none has been
selected in preference to a white male applicant .
Prior to 1965, the NCAES had established separate all-white and
all-black 4-H and extension homemaker clubs.

After 196~, the NC~F.g

requested a formal assurance from each such club that it would n~t
discriminate on the ba~is of race.

Nevertheless, there remain

, 4S

all white clubs, compared to the 1,474 all-white clubs existing in
1965 before any reme~ial action was taken.

Separate black and white

4-H and Extension Homemakers clubs exist in racially integrateJ
communities.
The individual petrs filed this suit in 1971, alleqing that
NCAES was guilty of discriminatory practices in violati,n

-

f

14th amendment and titles VI and VII of the Civil Rights Act

the

f

-

less

5 -

than one in three-thousand.

Resps' expert testimony was based

on a survey that added the factor of employee performance rating to
the racially neutral factors considered.

Resps also criticizen

petrs' survey, however, for failure to take account of such factors
as the differentials among merit and cost of living raises in
different counties.

The de found that resp had effectively rebutted

petrs' prima facie case of race discrimination, even if the
statistical evidence were sufficient to establish a prima facie
case.

The de accepted as valid resps' explanation that the pre-1965

wage disparities could not be cured immediately.
Petrs also presented evidence that of 123 county chairman
appointments since 1965, only six appointments had gone to blacks.
The ~c relied upon the fact that there were black applications for
only 18 of the county chairman positions becoming vacant since 1972,
when open applications were begun, and that the appointment of
blacks to six of these eighteen slots showed evidence of
discrimination to be insubstantial.
The de considered the evidence of individual discrimination
presented by each of the 38 named employment discrimination
plaintiffs.

In each case, the de found that the plaintiff had

failed to prove that he had suffered discrimination in either wages
or promotion.
The dq also rejected petrs claims based upon discrimination in
membership of 4-H clubs, reasoning that membership in all such clubs
was voluntary, and that there was no evidence that anyone had sought
and been denied membership in such a club on account of race since

1965.

- 6 -

CA4

affirmed.

Relying on Hazelwood School District v. United

states, 433 u.s. 299 (1977) and United Airlines v. Evans, 431 u.s.
553 (1977),

the panel majority reasoned that, like seniority

differentials based upon hiring discrimination that occurred prior
to the coverage of the Civil Rights Act, current salary
differentials that were the lingering result of salary differences
in practice prior to the coverage of public employers under the bar
against discrimination in "terms and conditions" of employment were
not in current violation of the Act.

The panel engages in a lengthy

critique of the statistical regression analysis presented by petrs
and concludes that, under the analysis, the racial differentials
could be the result of either differences in performance ratings or
(as to pre-1965 hires) due to the salary differentials in effect
prior to 1965.

Since pre-existing differentials is a neutral reason

for the current wage differences, the panel reasoned, the
statistical analysis was flawed.

The panel analyzed the performance

ratings and concluded that blacks were rated in the upper three
•quartiles• (qualifying them for raises) nearly as often as whites,
eltminating the possibility of discrimination in performance

Tile panel tbue affiraed tbe

ratinp.

~•

fln41ng that petra had

oo.e carzle4 their burden of provlnt intentional wage
Ia to. tile county cbalraan poaitiou, U.

Mire-. on

4

dlacrlaination.

~ that

lu

ceepoulble for De
of aadt4at

11111111••~•:
LWattn!•,

lt.~Mn

of White app11oante rHOJIR I d won

eo~•·••••;

or to the percentage of white appllaan

poeitiona generally, tbt pe e Glaf.
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recomme nded for the chairman slot was nearly equal.

Since the NCAES

can not be charged with possibly discriminatory hiring decisions
made by the third party county boards, the de correctly found on
violation of title vrr.
Pinally,

CA4

upheld the de finding that support of single race

4-H clubs was not in violation of title VI.

There was no evidence

that any black person had sought and been denied membership in an
organization, and the mere existence of single race clubs does not
violate the law.
Judge Phillips dissented in part.

Petrs' class should have

been certified, as petrs were challenging service-wide employment
practices.

Rejection of the salary discrimination claims was error,

as petrs were entitled to rely on race based salary differentials
that existed at the time suit was filed in 1971 , even though the
differentials were the result of previously legal salary
discrimination.

The Hazelwood-Evans principle does not apply to

current salary discrimination, as opposed to seniority rights.

~he

criticism of the statistical evidence, relied upon by the district

-

court, did not establish that consideration of the additional

factors would in fact affect the conclusion that the wage

~ihally, reiection of the claims

differentials were based on race.

based on segregation of 4-H clubs was also error, as both
regulations under Jitle VI and the 14th !mendment itself both impose
an affirmative duty to desegregate state supported programs that had

~ "freedom of choice" plan does

previously been segregated by law.

not satisfy that affirmative duty to desegregate.

~ v cl!~~

_s_c_h_oo_l____;;B:.....;;o...;::a;.::..r..::.d , 3 91 u . s • 4 3 0 ( 19 6 8 ) •
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~
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A

petition for rehearing en bane was denied by an equally

divided court.
CONTENTIONS AND DISCUSSION:

Wage discriminationPrivate petrs contend that the CA9 and the de erred in two
significant respects in rejecting their claims of wage
discrimination.

First, the holding that wage differentials

resulting from the carry over effects of prior discrimination
conflicts with decisions in several circuits

~olding

that wage

discrimination is a continuing violation, not subject to the
Hazelwood-Evans principle.

E . g., Lamphere v. Brown Universitv, 685

F . 2d 743, 747 (CAl 1982); Clark v. Olinkraft, Inc . , 556 F . 2d )219,
1222 (CAS 1977); Int'l Union of Electrical Workers v.

~estinghouse,

631 F.2d 1094 (CA3 180); Laffey v. Northwest Airlines, Inc., 56i
F.2d 429, 437-38 (CADC 1976);
73, 84-85 (r.A8 1969)

~orman

v.

~issouri

Pac .

R . ~.,

(Justice Blackmun, as r.ircuit Judge) .

414 F.2d
Petr

argues that the current wage differentials are the result not only
of pre-1965 hires having smaller salaries upon which raises were
based , but the continuing

~pplication

of discriminatory "wage

scales" adopted prior to 1965, even tn those hired since 1965.

Each

application of such discriminatory scales constitutes a new
violation of the Civil Rights Act .
Petrs second ground for challenging the

~p's

rejection of its

wage discrimination claims is based upon the ~c's treatment of their
statistical ~vi~ence.
Rawlinson, 433

u.s.

u.s.

Petr asserts that, under Oothard v.

321 (1977) and

~~amsters

v. United Stat~s, 4~\

324 (1977), statistical proof of a disparity in treatment of

-

9 -

blacks may not be rebutted simply by suggesting other factors that
the statistical survey might have considered.

Such a criticisM of

the statistical proof may be effective rebuttal only if accompanied
by evidence that consideration of these other factors would in fact
affect the conclusions of the study.

The CA4 erred in treating mere

speculation that other possible factors would affect the result as
sufficient rebuttal, and this holding is in conflict with decisions
in other circuits.

E.g., Trout v. Lehman, 702 F.2d 1044, 1102 (D.C.

Cir. 1983), vacated on other grounds, 79 L. Ed. 2d 732 (1984):

Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Service Comm'n, 630 F.2d 79 (CA2 1980):
Falcon v. General Telephone, 626 F.2d 369 (CAS 1980), rev'd on other
grounds 457

u.s. 147 (1982).

Since no statistical study could be

sufficiently exhaustive not to be subject to some speculation that
the addition of other factors would change the result, the eftect of
the CA4 rule is to preclude proof of race discrimination through the
use of statistical evidence.

Thus, the CA4 decision eftectively

nullifies Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401

u.s.

424 (1971).

The SG agrees that cert should be granted with respect to the
issue of carry-over effects of pre-1965 wage discrimination.
Correction of current pay differentials entails none of the
retroactivity problems that the correction of the effects of past
discrimination on current seniority status do.

The SG concedes,

however, that "this issue is a narrow one, and that this r.ourt's
resolution of that issue will not obviate the need for further
proceedings."

The s~ does not recommend that cert be granted on the

issue of the treatment of statistical evidence, since the SG
believes that the CA4's approach to the statistical question was

-

appropriat~.

~vid~nce

10 -

According to the SG, a

should be subject to

pl~intiff's

rebutt~l

statistical

based upon its failure to

consider factors that would reasonably be expected to have an impact
on the employment pattern challenged .
Resps point out that
seal~,"

th~re

i.s no such thing as a

N~AES

"w ag~

and that petrs' claims that current salary differentials are

the result of the pre-Act imposition of a discriminatory "wage
scale" is specious.

tn fact , the compensation paid to each employee

is the result of a complex matrix of factors , inclurling the level of
county support, the special skills of each agent , job performance ,
and location.

Essentially, the de made a factual finding , based

upon petrs' statistical evidence in their case in chief and based
upon rcsps ' rebuttal evidence , that no intentional discrimination
had taken place.

Petrs' factual dispute with the de findings does

not rise to the level of a circuit conflict .
analys~s

were rebutted not by

me~e

Petrs' statistical

speculation, hut hy proof that

factors such as different county across-the-board and merit
increases were not accounted for in petrs ' statistics.
The r.A4 ' s

~pparent

stateme n t that r.ace-hased wage differentials

are not actionable if they are the " lingering effects " of purposeful
discrimination in prior years is very troubling.

The Evans case

merely decided that a plaintiff could not revive a time-barred
employment discrimination clai m by seeki nq seniority lost

~uring

hPr

lapae of. Pmployment duP to the violative employer policy.
Similarly , Hazelwnod held mPrP l y that statistical
undPrrcprcecntat1on r)F. mt nor t tiPS on a public schoo]

not bP

r~l fed

upon to

rPfl~ct

faculty could

emp l oyment diacrimlnation to the

-

ll -

extent that the underrepresentation was due to hiring practices in
effect prior to the applicability of titl.e VII to public employers.
Rere, plaintiffs appear to be demanding simply that they currently
be paid the same wages that white NCAES employees with identical
qualifications, positions, and seniority are paid.

To the extent

that CA4 held that such current wage discrimination is justified by
historical wage discrimination against black employees of NCAES, its
decision is nonsensical as well as in conflict

wit~

cases cited by

petr holding that wage discrimination is a continuing violation of
title VII.
This holding is anything but clearly presented by this case,
however, since apart from petrs ' general statistical showing of wage
disparities, there is only anecdotal comparison ot: like employees in
like job positions in the same county.

Comparison of white and

black employees generally is muddled by the large differences in
compensation from county to county.

It is also unclear exactly how

pre-1965 de iure wage discrimination resulted in continuing
disparities--there was no evidence of a formal "wage scales" that
remained in effect.

The de examined each individual claim of wage

-=--

discrimination separately and determined that no intentional wage
discrimination had occurred.
Despite the SG's less than enthusiastic cert petn, 1 am
inclined to recommend a GRANT on the issue of whether wage
discrimination resulting from an employer ' s failure to adjust
individual black employees ' salaries upwards to bring such wages in

-

line with prevailing white salaries is exempted from the !itle Vti
requirement of equal terms and consitions of employment.

Despite

- 12 -

the cloudy factual circumstances in which this issue is presenten,
CA4's statistical analysis rests on the assumption that if the
current wage differentials were due to a failure to start paying
black employees the same wages as were paid to white employees in
the same jobs, permanent, purposeful maintenance of such wage
differentials would be legal.

This holding is not required by

Hazelwood and Evans, and creates a conflict in the circuits.
The CA4's treatment of the statjstical evidence is probably not
certworthy.

Both

~eamsters

and Dothard established that a title VII

plaintiff may rely on statistica1 proof to establish a prima-facie
case of discrimination and shift the burden of producing nondiscriminatory reasons for the disparity to the defendant.
Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450

Texas

u.s. 248 (1981).

However, both the QC and the CA4 agreed that resps' evidence in
rebuttal prevented petrs' from carrying their burden of proof as to
the ultimate issue regardless of whether petrs' evidence in fact
established a prima facie case.

The de relied upon both resps'

criticism of the validity and probative force of petrs' statistics
as well as upon the factual circumstances of the parti.cular
employees' claims of wage discrimination to conclude that petrs' had
not carried their burden of establishing intentional race baseo wage
discrimination.
In Dothard, the majority opinion noted that, where the
plaintiff has established a prima facie case via statistical
evidence, "If the employer discerns fallacies or deficiencies in the
data offered by the plaintiff, he is free to adduce countervailing
evidence of his own."

433

u.s.,

at 331.

Petr

points to several

- 13 -

circuit court decisions that suggest that such statistical proof may
be rebutted only by countervailing statistical evidence (Falcon;
Trout), or by evidence specifically relating the factors not
considered by the plaintiff's statistics to the wage disparities.
Guardian's Ass'n, 630 F.2d at 88 n.7.

According to

t~e

CA2 in

Guardian's Ass'n, "to accept ... unsupported possibilities,

a~d

require the plaintiffs to refute every circumstance that could
explain the disparate impact shown by the statistics, would create
an onerous burden of proof, far in excess of the title VII standard
as interpreted by the supreme Court."

Id.

Each of these decisions, however, involved review of a de
conclusion that the plaintiff's statistics had in fact carried the
burden of proof of discrimination.

In each of these cases, the

employer sought on appeal to establish that the

plaintiff'~

statistics were insufficient as a matter of law to carry the burden
of proof.

The CAs in these cases were rejecting the notion that, as

a matter of law, plaintiff's statistical proof must consider every
conceivably relevant factor to be sufficient to support a judgment.
I'm not sure that Teamsters, Dothard, or these circuit cases-- which
hold that plaintiff's statistical proof is sufficient to support a
judgment--necessarily suggest that plaintiff's statistical evidence
requires a favorable judgment even where the factfinrler, after
considering opposing expert testimony and anecdotal evidence,
determines that no discrimination has taken place.
In other words, none of these cases are inconsistent with the
idea that it is up to the factfinder, in the first instance, to
weigh the probative value of statistical evidence and determine

- 14 -

• • • tile Plaintiff haa pr:oven hi a caae, or: ...n eata&t1.1..,.. a
..,... laoie o•••· The de tn thta o••• ••PI'••••4 it• "oa&tta tha~ II.W
•'-tiet£Oa •••n auppor:t a Pl'iaa facie ca•e, 9iven tbelr fallace te
ooaalfar certain var!ablea. Pet. app. at 149a n.43.
tarking ln tbla o ..• •ifht be the lntereattng queatlon wbetber,

owce a plaintiff ..tab.liah•• a prl. . faa!• o... by u.e at
etatlattca, tile ~!e~t . _ ef!Mtt•e1r 1eb.ot tbe p1alntiff'•
olahl aole!y ._ oclt'tetsl-. the

••Jidit~

of tblr •utiatto•. Cf.

-

Building Contractors did.

The

15 -

CA4

decision conflicts with Norris,

since that decision held that the fact that the state delegated its
employee benefits program to an insurance company did not absolve
the state of liability under title

"!I

for the insurance company's

discriminatory benefit provisions.
The SG disagrees, and recommends that cert be
County Chairman issue.

denie~

on the

NCAF.S is responsible only for its own

employment decisions, and not those of third parties.

Norris, in

which the employer chose to offer only sexually discriminatory
benefit plans, is inapposite.

Here, the county, not Nr.AES, maoe the

employment decision.
Resps argue that since this is a

~itle

VII disparate treatment

case, which requires proof of intentional discrimination,

General

Contractors cannot be distinguished on the grounds suggested by
petrs.

In any case, there has been no delegation of the employment

decision, since NCAES has never had sole authority to
appointment of County Chairmen- -this authority

ha~

wielded by the county board , whtch has final. say.

ma~e

the

always been
The de examined

the facts of each applicant for county chairman positions
separately , and concluded in each case that there had been no
intentional racial discrimination by either NCAES or the county
board of commissioners.
I dont think that this issue is certworthy.

NCAES shared

appointment responsibility with the county boards, and, unlike the
employer in Norris who could choose to offer a different insurance
plan , NCAES apparently had no control over the actions or role of
the county boards of commissioners.

- 16 -

•-a

Clab clat.a-

Private petrs claia tbat the

~·s

finding that the support of

.olantarily all-vbite 4-R clubs is in conflict vitb this Oourt•s
decision in Green v. School Board. 391 u.s. 430 (1968) . vbicb beld
that a •freeaa. of cboice• plan was not a sufficient desegregation
relledy to offset prior de

jt.~re

scbool segregation.

In tbis case.

D.O.A. regulations pra.algated after Green require ezteDSiOD aid

recipients to take affir.ative steps to r..edy pcevloua de jure
segregation in such federally funded progra.s.

~e •free~

of

choice• plan in this case bas .anifestly failed. and just as such a
plan vas fOUDd deficient in Greea. so aast it be COftSlderecJ
def icitmt in this case.
ftae SG opposes the grant of cert OD tbia 1 - .

lftle SG

. .tnQlaa tlaat tbe Green case. decided in tbe coateat of -.regated
MDCia~

public ecltools. bas no application t:o a

-.olQJltu~

•

oqut•tt• eacla as the 4-11 club. Mapa maphasl•
tetJtJ.ftecl thai: be •

abe bacJ been eac1Qfle4t frca a 4-11 •

-••J:r•• clab oa the basts of race. ua
•••~

tUt . . , _

leal wre ooaaacted oa a

tba~

au

Bneaeloa

ecU•ltl• abGft

l~atel

._,••
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nq~inst

peLscns on the or0unrl of race ... the rec\pient must take

affirmative action to overcome the effects of prior discrimination."
rn Green, the court held that a freedom of choice plan that proved
ineffective to remedy prior
constitutionally sufficient.
be considered sufficient to

~e

jure

~egreqntion wa~

not

I'm not sure that such a p 1 an ought to
~atisfy

a regulatory duty to

deseqregute, but given the SG's apparent lack of interest in
enforcing the DOA regulation, l douht that the rourt

w~ll

be

interested in this issue.

Class CertificationPetr contends that the de's refusal to certify the class and
the CA4's affirmance violate this Court's decision in Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417

u.s. 156 (1974). EiRen held that a court

may not conduct an inquiry into the likelihood of succesB on the
merits preliminary to making its certification decision.

Yet by

prejudging the petrs' claims that employment decisions were
centralized, the de did just that, and by resting its affirmance of
the class certification issue on its determination that petrs'
claims on the merits were properly rejected, the CA4 compounded the
error.
The SG recommends against a grant of cert on this issue,
reasoning that in fact the petrs' can claim no prejudice oue to
their lack of class certification, since all class proof and
remedies were asserted by the
~

v. Falcon, 457

u.s.

u.s.

Resps rely on General ~eleph ne

147 (1982) for the correctness of the de's

refusal to certify: membership in the same race alone does not
establish commonality of claims, and the de correctly found that

- 18 -

since employment determinations were made on the county level
members of the putative class were not similarly situated.
This issue does not merit cert.

The

~c~s

inquiry into the

commonality of the putative class members ' claims was required

by

Rule 23, even if the question happened to parallel petrs '
substantive claim that employment decisions were centralized .

Nor

would class certification apparently have had any effect upon the
conduct of this case.
CONCLUSION:

The CA4's apparent reliance on an assumption that

prior wage discrimination against black employees is a valid excuse
for continuing wage discrimination as a "lingering effect" of such
prior discrimination is highly troubling, and conflicts with
decisions in other circuits. I recommend a

GRAN~

on this issue.

The relationship between statistical evidence and the burden
shifting rule of McDonnell-Douglas and Burdine has also provoked
much discussion in the circuits, but I do not believe that CA4's
affirmance of the de's rejection of such statistical evidence as
factually insufficient conflicts with Teamsters, Dothard, or any of
the circuit decisions cited by petrs, all of which affirmed a de's
acceptance of statistical proof as legally sufficient.

Given the

SG's lack of interest in enforcing the DOA regulation requiring
desegregation of 4-H clubs, I do not think that the sufficiency of
the freedom of choice plan is certworthy.

Finally, neither the

NCAES's responsibility for discriminatory appointments of county
chairmen by county boards of commissioners, nor the appropriateness
of class certification issues warrant review by this Court.
There is a response.

-

October 30, 1985
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Coplan

Opn in petn

